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TREATING OTHERS AS OUR OWN:
PROFESSOR LEVINSON, FRIENDSHIP,
RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SQUARE

Rodney K. Smith*

I.

INTRODUCTION

As to matters of religion in the public square, Professor Sanford Levinson
In this self("Sandy") 1 refers to himself as "a secular[] accommodationist."
description, Sandy adopts Professor Emily Hartigan's definition of secular
accommodationist: one who "'asks for the public to embrace the previously
personalized religious sphere, but does not [himself] demonstrate what he
advocates space for."' 3 Sandy further classifies himself as "an agnostic rather than
an atheist.",4 Nevertheless, Professor Rebecca French refers to Sandy as a member
of "a group variously called the New Religionists," given his "espous[al of] the
return to a serious consideration of religious issues in legal discourse." 5 I suspect
that Sandy finds the reference to him as a "New Religionist" to be endearing, in
much the way that I felt when a student came into my office and expressed his
deep appreciation for the fact that I acknowledged my Judaism in class. My
student had misconstrued my faith, given that I am a member of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints ("LDS Church"), but, in doing so, my student's
comments were clearly taken to be a compliment-a recognition of my desire to
be respectful of the deeply held views of my students. Sandy's record with regard
* Herbert Herff Chair of Excellence in Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law at the University
of Memphis. J.D., Brigham Young University; L.L.M., S.J.D., University of Pennsylvania. I am
grateful to Craig Dallon, Bobby Lipkin, Nathan Oman, and Val Ricks for thoughtful comments
regarding an earlier draft. I also gratefully acknowledge the excellent research and technical assistance
of Leeanne Austin and Karol Usmani, respectively. Finally, I am appreciative to Dean Don Polden
and the Herff Trust for research support for this project.
1. 1 have chosen to refer to Professor Levinson throughout this text as Sandy, rather than as
Professor Levinson or Professor Sanford Levinson, because it is the friendliest manner in which I
believe I can describe Sandy. Indeed, friends usually prefer to be called by their first name and until
Sandy indicates that he would prefer some other usage, I will use the personal form. Since much of this
essay is about how the notion of friendship or, as I put it, "treating others as our own," might influence
the place of religion in the public square, the use of the friendly form seems to be particularly
appropriate.
2. Sanford Levinson, The Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1873, 1876 (1994).
3. Id. at 1877 (citing to Professor Emily F. Hartigan) (brackets in original).
4. Id. at 1880 n. 41.
5. Rebecca R. French, Lamas, Oracles, Channels, and the Law: Reconsidering Religion and Social
Theory, 10 Yale J.L. & Humanities 505, 528, 529 (1998).
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to religion and religious liberty, even though he is not a religionist, certainly
evidences a depth of respect for those who hold religious views.
When pressed to explain why he is so respectful of religionists and their
participation in the public square, Sandy responded:
I am unpersuaded by the evidence of God's existence or participation in human
history. Yet I cannot find it in me to condemn as "irrational" those who are
religious. Perhaps the [best] answer... [is] that some of my best friends, whom I
respect both as decent human beings and ... serious intellectuals,
are deeply
•6
religious, and I am unwilling to dismiss them as being necessarily deluded.
Sandy indicates that he defines himself as a "secularist," and adds that he
"possess[es] no 'religious' beliefs, as conventionally defined." 7 He does, however,
"continue strongly to identify [himself] as Jewish .... "8
Sandy, in a related context, also fondly relates that:
In looking back and trying to determine, for better or worse, what might help to
account for the development of my particular persona, I often think of [my
childhood] friends [of various faiths] and of our discussions [regarding religious
matters]. I am convinced that they had far more to do with my becoming an
academic intellectual than anything that took place during the generally dreary
school days, during which my primary achievement was getting so many C's in
"cooperation" that I was ineligible for the National Honor Society. It was with
John, Jim, Benny Cole, and Gar that I became comfortable exploring some basic
issues of life. I remain forever grateful to them. 9
He adds, "[m]y own life was immeasurably aided by friendships, the result,
with one exception, of mutual attendance at the local public school with other
youngsters who, from a variety of perspectives, unabashedly took religious
questions seriously."'
Obviously, Sandy takes his friendship with religious
individuals seriously enough that it contributes to the very respectful, even
accommodationist, approach he takes toward those who are serious about their
religion and the law.

6. See Levinson, supra n. 2., at 1880 n. 41.
7. Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, "Equal Concern and Respect," and the
Establishment Clause of the FirstAmendment, 27 U. Rich. L. Rev. 989, 1008 (1993).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 994.
10. Id. Sandy even notes,
I particularly remember my Southern Baptist friends expressing seemingly genuine regret
that my failure to acknowledge Jesus as my Savior condemned me to eternal torment in hell.
They would have preferred knowing that I would join them in heaven. This was said by
them, and perceived by me, without the slightest personal hostility. My non-saved fate was,
from their perspective, simply a statement of theological fact, and their attempt to save me
from what was quite literally a fate worse than death was, consequently, an act of friendship.
Imagine, for example, a friend observing someone close to him or her driving while
intoxicated. Surely we would not expect the friend to remain silent and accept as dispositive,
following a fatal accident, the statement: "Well, it was her life, and friends don't interfere
with one another." Friends ought to warn one another about perceived dangers facing them.
Id. at 993-94.
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A thesis central to this essay is that friendship or "affection"" for the other
should inform our analysis regarding the treatment of religion in our legal system.
I refer to this concept as "treating the other as our own" and believe that it can be
used to help bring clarity to difficult and often contentious areas of the law. For
example, in discussing counseling of clients, I often raise this concept because
students are inclined to treat a non-related client in one manner and a friend or
family member in another. They defer to what they consider to be their nonrelated client's interests, which they generally consider to be economic, but they
acknowledge that they would engage in a more robust moral dialogue with a
family member or friend. I then inquire as to why they would choose to counsel
one way with a client and another way with a close friend or family member. Is it
because the client is less than, more than, or just different than a friend or family
member? This discussion causes my students to take questions related to their
counseling obligations much more seriously, and I submit it might have equal or
greater applicability in the law and religion context. Even if such an analysis
might not change the law-I argue in many contexts that it would-it would
certainly cause us to take the issues much more seriously, which would be a
benefit in and of itself. 2
In a forthcoming note in the Harvard Law Review, Nathan Oman asserts
that our law or legal system has largely failed to take religion seriously on its own
terms:
Ultimately, current justifications of religious freedom fail because they do not take
religion seriously on its own terms. No Muslim believes that he should make a
pilgrimage to Mecca in order to raise the general level of civic virtue. He does it
because his faith that "there is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his Prophet"
teaches that only by completing the hadj can he qualify to entry into paradise.
Likewise, Orthodox Jews are not interested in creating mediating institutions but in
faithfully fulfilling the conditions of the covenant God made with Moses and Israel
on Mount Sinai. Buddhist temples are not factories for the production of social
capital but places where people attempt to follow the example of Buddha to
nirvana. Christian churches are meetings of "fellow citizens with the saints, and of
the household of God" seeking salvation through Jesus Christ the Son of God. In
short, the current arguments generally offered in favor of religious liberty have

11. Sandy desires a multicultural society "whose members are nonetheless bonded by mutual
respect and, if this is not too completely utopian, affection." Id. at 997.
12. It is clear that an essay such as this is an insufficient forum for developing a complete legal
theory based on "friendship." Accordingly, it is not intended to explore fully how application of the
notion of friendship might impact our legal system. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that law, with
rules that necessarily regulate and limit human behavior, may not, by its very nature, be fully
susceptible to a legal theory based on friendship, because such limitations are often viewed as being
unfriendly by the person whose activity is being restricted. Additionally, this essay does not delineate
how notions of friendship, based on "treating the other as our own," and justice, which applies to
strangers and even enemies, might intersect. For the purposes of this essay, it is enough that the reader
get a sense of how the notion of friendship might influence the manner in which religion is accorded
space in the public square.
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nothing to do with the ultimate concerns that are
3 at the heart of religious belief.
They simply do not take such concerns seriously.'

Nathan goes on to argue that "despite the cosmic, spiritual, intellectual, and
practical significance of religion, the modern state cannot seem to take account of
religion's self-understanding of its own importance."1 4 Sandy, however, does seem
to take religionists and religion seriously in his contributions to the scholarly
dialogue in the law and religion area, even though he does not share their
epistemology of faith. His approach is enlightening, I believe.
In examining how viewing religionists and religion in a friendly lighttreating them as our own-might influence law in the church and state area, I will

draw on themes explored in Sandy's work in this area. In Part II, I will examine,
in a rather personal way, what Sandy describes as the "confrontation [between]
religious faith and [our] civil religion,"' 5 as played out in the confirmation process
regarding Roman Catholic Justices. Part III, in turn, focuses on the role of
religious dialogue in the public square. Based on observations drawn in Parts II
and III, Part IV will take the friendship model and argue for the need for

exemptions from so-called neutral laws or laws of general applicability in the
religious liberty area. 16 Finally, Part V is a brief conclusion and final tribute to
Sandy, as a friend to religion and the Constitution.

13. Nathan Oman, Student Author, Pensees on Religious Liberty, 116 Harv. L. Rev.

__

(forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 11-12, on file with author).
14. Id. at 19. Building on themes akin to those noted in Pascal's Wager, Oman endeavors to
develop a justification for taking the views of religionists seriously and on their own terms. For our
purposes, however, it is enough to focus on the premise that treating religionists as friends, as Sandy
seems to do, necessarily entails taking their views seriously in a legal sense.
15. Sanford Levinson, The Confrontationof Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming

Justices, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 1047, 1047 (1990).
16. So-called neutral laws in the religious context may not be neutral, in fact, given that majority
religionists can either obtain legislative exemptions from such laws or can prohibit the passage of such
laws in the first instance. They may be textually neutral but they generally are neither neutral in their
genesis nor neutral in their application. Michael Perry describes this form of religious discrimination
or lack of neutrality:
Government bans a practice that is, for some who want to engage in it, a religious practice
and, for others, a nonreligious practice. Moreover, government refuses to exempt religious
instances of the practice. However, government would have exempted religious instances of
the practice had government not been hostile or indifferent to the religious group for which
the practice is religious-hostile or indifferent to the group because of its specifically
religious beliefs. Government thereby discriminates against the group in violation of free
exercise.
Michael J. Perry, Lecture, What Do the Free Exercise and NonestablishmentNorms Forbid? Reflections
on Constitutional Law of Religious Freedom (Minneapolis, Minn., Oct, 17-18, 2002) (manuscript at 13,

on file with author) (paper delivered at a conference at the University of St. Thomas School of Law
(Minneapolis)). Michael offers the following specific example:
if C is the ingestion of peyote, and if the sacramental ingestion of peyote is a ritual of the
Native American Church, then though a legislature may well have banned C even if C were
not, for members of the Native American Church, in certain circumstances, a sacramental
act, it may still be the case that the legislature would have exempted the sacramental
ingestion of peyote from the ban on C if the legislature had not been hostile or at least
indifferent to the Native American Church as a religious group. We know that a racial
group can be victim of a policymaker's racially selective sympathy and indifference, just as
we know that women can be victims of a policymaker's sexually selective sympathy and
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RELIGION AND THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS

Over a decade ago, Sandy "examine[d] some of the implications of the
subsuming of religious identities within the more secular-or at least nonsectarian-culture of American constitutionalism.' 7 In particular, Sandy focused
on "exchanges occurring during confirmation hearings held in regard to [Roman]
Catholic nominees for the United States Supreme Court.""s Sandy's conclusion is
not heartening:
What is interesting is not whether law and morality are inevitably and inextricably
connected in the practical doing of constitutional analysis, for surely the answer is
yes, but how we come to terms with this fact on those occasions when it is most
important to state the fundamental creed of our constitutional order, such as
confirmation ceremonies. Generally speaking, I think we do a fairly terrible job of
it. A process that leads men and women of undoubted intelligence and integrity to
say things that they cannot possibly wish to have represented as their 19
genuine
reflections on complex and important matters scarcely provokes admiration.

I relate this sobering conclusion made by one of our nation's most thoughtful
constitutional scholars at the outset of this part of this essay because I want to
draw attention to the problem addressed in Sandy's article regarding the
confirmation of Catholic Justices. He notes that all three Catholic Justices
confirmed by the Senate were asked a version of the following question, which
was addressed to Justice Brennan:
"You are bound by your religion to follow the pronouncements of the Pope on all
matters of faith and morals. There may be some controversies which involve
matters of faith and morals and also matters of law and justice. But in matters of
law and justice, you are bound by your oath to follow not papal decrees and
doctrines, but the laws and precedents of this Nation. If you should be faced with
such a mixed issue, would you be able to follow the requirements of your oath or
would you be bound by your religious obligations?" 2 °

Sandy then notes William Brennan's response to this question, which was
similar to answers given by Justices Kennedy and Scalia when asked versions of
that same question:
"Senator, I think the oath that I took is the same one that you and all of the
Congress, every member of the executive department up and down all levels of
government take to support the Constitution and laws of the United States. I took
that oath just as unreservedly as I know you did ....And I say not that I recognize
that there is any obligation superior to that, rather that there isn't any obligation of
faith superior to that. And my answer to the question is categorically that in

indifference. Similarly, a religious group can be a victim of a policymaker's religiously
selective sympathy and indifference.
Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
17.
18.
19.
20.

Levinson, supra n. 15, at 1048.
Id.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1062 (citation omitted).
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everything I have ever done, in every office I have held in my life or that I shall ever
do in the future, what shall control me is the oath that I took to support the

Constitution and laws of the United States and so act upon the cases21 that come
before me for decision that it is that oath and that alone which governs."
Sandy is troubled, as I am, by both the question and the answer given by
Justice Brennan. Indeed, Sandy
sadly concludes that Brennan's answer "reduce[s
22
his] Catholicism to a 'hobby.'
Sandy also fears that a dialogue of this sort has the potential of "strip[ping]
law of any necessary connection to morality, '23 because religious commitment is
but one form of moral commitment. Dallin H. Oaks, who currently serves as a
member of The Quorum of Twelve Apostles of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, and formerly served as a state supreme court justice, law
professor, and educator, made a similar observation: "[Slome secularists argue
that our laws must be entirely neutral, with no discernible relation to any
particular religious tradition. Such proposed neutrality is unrealistic,
unless we
24
are willing to cut away the entire idea that there are moral absolutes.,
Cast in that light, the question certainly is not friendly either to the nominee
or the Constitution itself. It is not friendly to a nominee, because friends do not
demand that those close to them choose between their religious conscience and
something dear to them, as clearly the rule of law would be in the case of Justices
Brennan, Kennedy, and Scalia. By the same token, given that such questions are
designed to equate moral commitment with opposition to the Constitution, they
can hardly be said to benefit the Constitution, because great constitutional
questions certainly raise moral issues that must be dealt with in a sensitive
manner. When King Nebuchadnezzar demanded that Daniel either cease to pray,
in keeping with a silly law that had been passed at the behest of conniving
advisors, or suffer the penalty attached to the law-death-it was not a friendly
question. It certainly was not friendly to Daniel, and it was not friendly to
Nebuchadnezzar's Kingdom, because the law would result in the King losing a
trusted and highly moral advisor. Although the penalty of answering the Senate's
question in keeping with one's religious conscience is not physical death, it does
result in a major deprivation to the individual or to the moral legitimacy of the
Constitution.25

21. Id. at 1063 (citation omitted).
22. Levinson, supra n. 2, at 1886. Sandy may be engaging in a bit of an overstatement. Justice
Brennan noted that the oath itself is an obligation of great significance in his faith. As such, keeping
the oath is more than a hobby for Justice Brennan-it is also a matter of faith.
23. Levinson, supra n. 15, at 1075.
24. 138 Cong. Rec. S3894-02 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1992).
25. Answering such a question by indicating that one's faith might take precedence could
substantially diminish the likelihood that the nominee would be confirmed by those who do not share
the nominee's faith. The cost of unfriendly questions can be high. There may be occasions when such
questions are warranted; but, a friendly Senator would be sensitive to the personal costs to and the
potential for discrimination against the speaker. A friendly Senator would, therefore, indicate why
such a question had to be asked and answered.
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Nevertheless, endeavoring to recognize, as Justices Brennan, Kennedy, and
Scalia surely did, that one's answer to such an ill-advised question might well
determine his or her fate as a Supreme Court nominee, I have given considerable
thought as to how I would answer such a question, in light of my own religious
tradition. Of course, given that the odds against my ever being asked such a
question are infinitesimally greater than the odds offered in April of 2002 that the
California Angels would win the World Series in October, my answer is merely
academic and does not carry the consequences that attended the raising and
answering of the question by actual nominees. It is surely easier, therefore, for me
to give an answer that takes greater account of the higher moral ground than did
the answers offered by our three Catholic nominees discussed in Sandy's article.
The question posed to me, as a committed member of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints ("LDS Church"), would be framed a bit differently. It
might be asked in the following form:
You are bound by covenant to work to build the Kingdom of God. Additionally,
you "believe all that God has revealed, all that He does now reveal, and ... that He
will yet reveal many great and important things pertaining to the Kingdom of
God. ' 6 Indeed, you believe that God still speaks through living prophets and that
you should be obedient in heeding those commands. As such, there may be
controversies that involve matters of your revealed faith and morals and matters of
law and justice. But in matters of law, you are bound by your oath to follow not
prophetic decrees and doctrines, but the laws and precedents of the Nation. If you
should be faced with such a mixed issue, would you be able to follow the
requirements of your oath or would you be bound by your religious covenants, your
duty to God?
Given that I can think of just such an issue-the conflict between my church
and the government regarding the religiously mandated practice of polygamy in
the nineteenth century-I would be duplicitous if I were to try to avoid it by
clever argumentation.
The LDS Church, based on latter-day revelation, permitted the practice of
polygamy under specified circumstances. The LDS Church asserted, as well, that
the practice was constitutionally protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. On three occasions, however, the Supreme Court rejected our free
exercise claim. In the first case, the imprisonment of members of the LDS Church
for practicing polygamy was upheld. 7 In the second case, the Court upheld an
Idaho law that prohibited members of the LDS Church from voting because they
were members of a church that recognized polygamy, regardless of whether
individual would-be voters in fact practiced polygamy. 28 Given that even these
rather draconian efforts to enforce the law against polygamy failed to keep

26. James E. Talmage, A Study of the Articles of Faith: Being a Consideration of the Principal
Doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 2 (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Sts.

1972).
27. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
28. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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members from continuing to espouse polygamy, the Court upheld the
government's taking of the Salt Lake Temple, other property, and the corporate
charter of the LDS Church itself.29 Members of the LDS Church remained true to
their covenant to God and continued to support the practice of polygamy, until
Wilford Woodruff, who was revered by members of the LDS Church as the Lord's
prophet, received a revelation from God. In his words:
The Lord showed me by vision and revelation exactly what would take place if we
did not stop this practice. If we had not stopped it, you would have had no use
for.., any of the men in [the Temple, where sacred work could be done for our
kindred dead]; for all ordinances would be stopped throughout the land of Zion.
Confusion would reign.., and many men would be made prisoners. This trouble
would have come upon the whole Church, and we should have been compelled to
stop the practice. Now, the question is, whether it should be stopped in this manner,
or in the way the Lord has manifested to us, and leave our Prophets and Apostles
and fathers free men, and the temples in the hands of the people, so that the dead
may be redeemed....
I saw exactly what would come to pass if there was not something done. I have had
this spirit upon me for a long time. But I want to say this: I should have let all the
temples go out of our hands; I should have gone to prison myself, and let every
other man go there, had not the God of heaven commanded me to do what I did do;
and when the hour came that I was commanded to do that, it was3 all clear to me. I
went before the Lord, and I wrote what the Lord told me to write. 0
The words of the Lord that President Woodruff was commanded to reveal
included the declaration that the LDS Church was no longer teaching or practicing
polygamy and that: "Inasmuch as laws have been enacted by Congress forbidding
plural marriages, which laws have been pronounced constitutional by the court of
last resort, I hereby declare my intention to submit to those laws, and to use my
influence with the members of the Church over which I preside to have them do
likewise."'"
The Lord's Prophet had spoken and LDS Church members were no longer
bound, under the covenant, to accept the doctrine of polygamy. Indeed, since the
date when the revelation was received and officially accepted by the LDS Church
membership, we have not lived the law of polygamy. In fact, Church disciplineexcommunication-is extended to any members who continue to teach or practice
polygamy.
For the purposes of answering the question, however, the experience with
polygamy may be unrepresentative, but it remains enlightening. As members, we

29. Late Corp. of the Church ofJesus Christof Latter-daySts. v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
30. Wilford Woodruff, Pres., Addresses, Excerpts from Three Addresses by President Wilford
Woodruff Regarding the Manifesto (Salt Lake City, Utah, Oct. 11, 1890) (first ellipses in original and
other ellipses omitted) (available at <http://scriptures.lds.org/od/l>).
31. Wilford Woodruff, Official Declaration: Prohibiting Plural Marriages, in Manifesto of the
Presidency and Apostles 4 (Dec. 12, 1889) (microformed on Western Americana: FrontierHistory of the
Trans-Mississippi West, 1550-1900, No. 1183, Research Publications., Inc. 1975) (available at
<http://scriptures.lds.org/od/l >).
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continued to espouse the practice until the Lord, through his living Prophet,
declared that it was no longer the will of the Lord and we were no longer bound
by it. The following is a sketch 2 of my answer:
At the outset, I believe that the question is inappropriate, constitutionally and as a
matter of prudence; but, I will answer it. In our Twelfth Article of Faith, as
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, we make clear our
strongly held belief, which I wholeheartedly share, that we should obey, honor, and
sustain the law. 33 Indeed, we believe that the Constitution itself is inspired of God.
As such, I am committed to the rule of law. But like Daniel of old, I believe that my
obligation to God takes precedence over my obligations to the law. Having said
that, I must emphasize that I can think of few if any instances when my obligations
to God would be in sufficient conflict with the constitutional law of the land that I
would be forced to choose between the two. But, if such an instance arose, I
believe, with Daniel of old, that my duty to God would take precedence over my
oath. In such an instance, I would either recuse myself from hearing the case or, if
absolutely necessary, resign my position on the Court.
My response would be friendly. When a friend asks a difficult question, one
may indicate why he finds the question to be inappropriate and might even
explain why the question should be withdrawn in the interests of friendship. But,
if a friend persisted, desiring a response, I would assume that the question was
being asked in furtherance of an important dialogue, and an answer would be
given, if at all possible. Friends discuss difficult issues openly. Even though I
might not be treated as a friend, in turn, I would not rationalize away my
obligation to treat the Senator and the Constitution under which he or she is
operating with respect and affection.
Actually, given the extreme unlikelihood that any such conflict between my
duty to God and my oath to abide by the Constitution would arise during my
tenure,34 I might even suggest a better question. The question I believe the
Senator really wants to ask is whether my religious views or background would
influence my decisionmaking on a regular basis. In other words, when the
decision in a given case is open to question, and my religious views might prompt
me to lean in one direction or another, would I give heed to my religious views. In
some measure, the answer to that question also has to be yes, although I am, in

32. If I were in fact involved in the confirmation process, my answer would be more elaborate,
including examples. For present purpose, however, a sketch should suffice.
33. Talmage, supra n. 26, at 3.
34. The potential for a genuine conflict between religious views and the daily work of a Justice is
quite limited. In those instance where such a conflict might arise, recusal would normally suffice to
remedy the conflict. In exceedingly rare instances, resignation might be required. For example, a
polygamist Justice who felt compelled to continue the practice, as a matter of religious conscience,
would no doubt have to resign his position on the Court after it upheld the constitutionality of laws
making the practice legal. Today, since my religious faith does not ascribe to the practice of polygamy,
this would present no conflict in my case. It is, however, illustrative, as an exceedingly rare instance in
which resignation and not recusal would be required to resolve a conflict between one's religious faith
and one's constitutional oath. At any rate, such a question hardly seems worth asking, since there are
remedies that could be invoked in those very rare occasions when a true conflict between one's
religious conscience and his or her oath to abide by the Constitution would arise.
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some measure, religiously committed to the rule of law and would have to weigh
that commitment in the balance. This question-whether one's religious views
ought to be a part of the public dialogue and permitted to influence
decisionmaking in the public square-raises the issues discussed in the next part
of this essay.
III.

RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: A FRIENDLY APPROACH

Sandy and one of my dearest friends in the academy, Professor Robert Justin
Lipkin ("Bobby"), are committed to treating those who hold religious beliefs in a
friendly manner. Despite the fact that they both desire to treat me, and other
religionists, in a friendly manner, they disagree as to the nature and extent to
which religious dialogue is welcome in the public sphere. I will briefly examine
their differences and the relative merits of their arguments through the lens of the
friendship analysis suggested in this essay. After doing so, I will indicate how I
would like to be treated in a public square that takes my religious views seriously
and offers the hand of friendship in the process. Realizing, as well, that friendship
is necessarily reciprocal, I will discuss obligations I feel toward my friends-other
participants in the public square who do not hold my religious beliefs or any
religious beliefs at all.
In responding to the work of another friend of mine, Michael Perry, Sandy
has articulated a view that is quite congenial to involvement by the religious in the
public dialogue:
One might well wonder why any citizen of a democratic republic should have to
engage in epistemic abstinence. Why doesn't liberal democracy give everyone an
equal right, without engaging in any version of epistemic abstinence, to make his or
her arguments, subject, obviously, to the prerogative of listeners to reject the
arguments should they be unpersuasive (which will be the case, almost by definition,
with arguments that are not widely accessible or are otherwise marginal)? It seems

enough for those of us who are secular to disagree vigorously with persons
presenting theologically-oriented views of politics. To suggest as well that they are
estopped even from presenting such arguments seems gratuitously censorial rather
than wise, especially in a country as remarkably pluralistic as is the United States,
where it is simply unthinkable that the members
of a particularistic religion could
35
ever capture national political institutions.

35. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 2061, 2077
(1992) (reviewing Michael J. Perry, Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American
Politics (Oxford U. Press 1991)). Sandy adds that he:

no longer find[s] compelling the premise that the prohibition of certain substantive religious
intrusions by government also means that even conscientious legislators, let alone citizens,

must, as a constitutional matter, concern themselves with examining their motivations or the
arguments that they offer in behalf of non-prohibited legislative ends. Prudence will, of
course, often counsel against making non-sectarian arguments, but this is far different than
arguing that such arguments are required as a matter of basic principle.
Id. at 2078.
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However, Sandy makes it clear that he believes that it is necessary to restrain
some religious expression or activity in the public square under the auspices of the
Establishment Clause:
Accepting religious arguments as appropriate for the public square does not mean
abandoning the Establishment Clause. I would interpret the Clause to prohibit the
use of the state apparatus to declare theological positions or otherwise infuse an
overtly religious sensibility into public life. I would, therefore, not hesitate to hold
unconstitutional the placement of "In God We Trust" on our coins and "under
God" in the pledge of allegiance to the flag, as well as the appointment by a state
legislature of an official chaplain or the sponsorship by government of creches and
other religious symbols. This does not mean, however, that I would interpret the
Amendment to bar voucher or tax credit systems that include as possible recipients
religiously affiliated schools and day care programs.36
Particularly in the latter educational context, in characteristic and charming
candor, Sandy acknowledges that his accommodationist stance is based, in part, on
an ulterior motive, and should not be read as an indication that he takes
religionists' views seriously on the merits. In his words:
I have.., tried, quite self-consciously, to present myself as a wonderfully tolerant
person who genuinely wishes to reach out to persons of decidedly different
sensibility from my own. Yet candor requires me to admit that one reason I would
prefer.., children.., to [feel welcome in attending] public schools is precisely to
increase the likelihood that they might be lured away from the views-some of them
only foolish, others, alas, quite pernicious-of their parents. Perhaps
they will meet
37
and begin talking with, and learning from, more secular students.
Sandy's largely friendly accommodationist view has been viewed as being
quite friendly by many religionists and might have been one of the reasons that
Professor French referred to him as one of the "New Religionists."
After quoting Sandy's point-"Why doesn't liberal democracy give
everyone an equal right, without engaging in any version of epistemic abstinence,
to make his or her arguments, subject, obviously, to the prerogative of listeners to
reject the arguments should they be unpersuasive (which will be the case, almost
by definition, with arguments that are not widely accessible or are otherwise
marginal)?" 38-Bobby, counters,
isn't this a rather hollow commitment to religion in the public square? If such views
are likely to be unpersuasive "which will be the case, almost by definition," is one
truly engaging religious citizens in democratic debate or merely paying lip service to
such engagement? Would Levinson permit the secularist to simply
reject the
39
religionist's argument out of hand on the grounds of inaccessibility?

36.
37.
38.
39.
2003)

Id. at 2077-78.
Levinson, supra n. 7, at 1019.
See text accompanying supra note 35.
Robert Justin Lipkin, Reconstructing the Public Square, _ Cardozo L. Rev.
(manuscript at 40, on file with author).
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Put in the terms of this essay, Bobby does not find Sandy's views to be
particularly friendly to the religionist. Bobby argues that:
To be fair, Levinson continues: "It seems enough for those of us who are secular to
disagree vigorously with persons presenting theologically-oriented views of politics."
The question is how does one "disagree vigorously" with arguments that one is
almost by definition inclined to find unpersuasive. When one finds a position
unpersuasive "almost by definition" one cannot vigorously disagree, although one
certainly disagrees. Vigorous[] disagreement can only occur when one appreciates
the force of one's opponent's views. Surely, some common ground might be gained
if both the parties seek to reconstruct their arguments in a more listener-friendly
fashion. Levinson's conclusion is, I think, the reason some secularists and
progressives reject the exclusionist [or strict separation] argument. Levinson writes
"[t]o suggest... [that religionists] are estopped even from presenting such argument
seems gratuitously censorial rather than wise, especially in a country as remarkably
pluralistic as is the United States, where it is simply unthinkable that members of a
particularistic religion could ever capture national political institutions." The
"gratuitously censorial" seems to indicate that it is simply bad form to exclude
religion in a country that could not experience a religious coup d'etat. But why
should that be relevant? And is not Levinson's assertion that religious views are
"almost by definition" unpersuasive worse than assertions that are gratuitously
censorial[?]; it patronizingly "accepts" religious arguments but doesn't really take
them seriously. We need a conception of the public square that takes all citizens
seriously[,J even the conscientious objector who seems to get an equally bad deal
from both exclusionists and inclusionists like Levinson. Further, does Levinson's
argument then rest on the assumption that since religion could never achieve the
unthinkable in the United States-especially religions that might intend to capture
these institutions-there is no harm in letting religionists blather? Rather than
courting religious[] voices, this view, in the guise of democratic community, appears
to be patronizing. n
In declaring Sandy's views to be "patronizing" in some measure, Bobby
seems to be warning the religionist that Sandy may not be the friend he appears to
be on first blush. Bobby goes on to assert a view that would limit participation by
the religionist in the public dialogue, but does so in a manner than he claims is
friendly toward religionists and non-religionists alike.
Bobby argues that dedicated arguments, including but not limited to many
faith-based or religious arguments, should be "translate[d] or reconstruct[ed]...
into deliberative discourse in the public square.""n
He defines dedicated
arguments as:
arguments [that] are committed to the following elements: (1) The existence of
canonical texts, unalterable foundations such as nature or history, or authoritative
persons; (2) Moral knowledge is given in experience and reasoning and is more or
less complete; (3) There exists one true set of moral values; (4) Conflicts are

40. Id. at 40-41 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 53.
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resolved by reference to canonical authority; and (5) Criticism, if permissible at all,
is strictly limited .
In turn, he describes deliberative arguments as arguments:
committed to these elements: (1) Authority consists in the most normatively
attractive and best-defended judgments that the moral community embraces; (2)
Moral knowledge is incomplete and evolutionary; (3) Values must be continuously
refined and even sometimes abandoned; (4) Deliberation is required for consensus
and (5) Deliberation is perennially pragmatic, fallibilistic, and
and disagreement;
43
revisable.

Bobby, however, would not apply his deliberativist theory in a draconian
manner. He would permit exceptions to his requirement that the public dialogue
be deliberativist:
if someone judges that, for conscientious reasons, he or she cannot reconstruct the
relevant dedicated arguments into a deliberative one, so be it. At this point, any
good faith deliberativist would attempt to translate his or her deliberative discourse
into the dedicativist's language. Rather than defeat the point of deliberativism, it
reveals some additional virtues. Above all else, deliberativism is committed,
through empathy, humility, and accountability, to reaching (communicating with
and understanding) other citizens. Typically this involves a shared deliberativism
language, but in the case of the conscientious objector, the deliberativist gladly turns
the table by translating, if possible, the deliberativist discourse into a dedicated
one.... However, it should be kept in mind that widespread conscientious
objection to deliberative discourse is incompatible with democracy.4
With this conscientious objector exception for the dedicativist, including
many religionists, Bobby's argument begins to track more closely with the form of
accommodation envisioned by Sandy, even though Bobby and Sandy differ in
particulars and in some substantive ways.
I have other friends, some of whom are deeply religious, who advocate much
less accommodation for religion in the public square. These strict separationists,
or "exclusionists," to use Bobby's terminology, 45 are wary of any religious
involvement in the public dialogue. For them, the Establishment Clause may be
read to "preclude religion from controlling the state because doing so inevitably
inhibits the religious freedom of minority religions as well as the freedom of
nonreligious individuals. 46 Bobby adds:
The general reason for disestablishment is freedom of conscience. Indeed, freedom
of conscience-and the joint fear of religion in government and government in
[Some]
religion-constitutes the general reason for both religion clauses....
religion[s] historically [have] sought dominion over other religions with the result of
Religious domination through control of the
persecuting the unfaithful....

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 45-46.
Lipkin, supra n. 39, at 54-55.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 30.
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government causes direct and unavoidable injury. Religious domination through
the control47 of the public square can become even more unavoidable and
oppressive.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there are religious and non-religious
groups and individuals alike who oppose accommodating religion in the public
square. Some religious groups have historically advocated that religion and
government be strictly separated.48
In articulating my position 49-what I believe to be a friendly position toward
the role of religion in the public square-I will focus on insights drawn from
Sandy and Bobby's respective views. In the process, I will also endeavor to be
sensitive to those who hold less accommodationist views. In doing so, I will focus
on how I, as one who takes my religion seriously, would want to be treated in the
public square and how I should be sensitive to the views of others. In particular, I
will examine the circumstances under which I would want to address issues or
articulate views from my religious perspective; or, if you will, in my religious
voice."'
A.

Speaking in a Religious Voice

Of great importance to me, and I suspect to most religionists, is a desire to
be treated with respect and to be taken seriously as one whose religion is central
to one's self-definition and one's sense of the world itself. If I am respected and
taken seriously in that regard, I will not be told that I may address issues but may
only do so in a non-religious way. Put otherwise, I do not want to be told that I
may speak or participate actively in the public sector, but am precluded from
addressing that which is of most importance to me-my religion or the core of my
self-definition, which is religious. No friend would demand so much; friends do
not ask their friends to yield up that which is of greatest importance to them in
their lives in order to engage in an important dialogue.
Having said this, I acknowledge that the instances when I would want to
speak in a religious voice would no doubt be quite limited for a number of
reasons. First, when I speak from my religious perspective, or in a religious voice,
I may alienate, or at least confuse, friends who do not share that voice or
perspective. Friends typically develop a shared language, a language that each
understands. The same is true of friends engaging in a public dialogue-they

47. Id. at 32.
48. See e.g. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Religious Bodies Which Support
Church-StateSeparation <http://www.au.org/religious/religiousgroups.htm> (accessed Feb. 20, 2003).
49. What is friendly for one religious person or group might not be considered friendly by another
religious individual or group. It is not surprising, therefore, that religious individuals and groups hold a
wide variety of positions regarding the role of religion in the public square. Given that this is the case,
the points I make regarding friendship in the public square are personal and may not be generalized to
include other individuals, even within my own religious faith. Nevertheless, I trust that they will be
illustrative of how one might use the notion of "friendship" to examine the role of religion in the public
square.
50. By religious voice, I simply mean speaking or participating in an openly religious manner.
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should want to be understood and to understand the other. Friends have
conversations, not monologues.
In a related sense, in the public square one generally desires to exert
influence upon the decisionmaking process. This is hardly possible when one
speaks in an alien or inaccessible voice, as many religionists do when they speak
the tongue or canon of their religion. Even if the words are understandable,
absent a common understanding and perhaps even commitment to the underlying
religious beliefs, the words cannot be fully understood. Given that one's religious
tongue is often as inaccessible to the nonbeliever as a foreign language,5 it is
imprudent for a religionist to speak in his or her religious voice if he or she desires
to influence the ultimate decision. The religious language or voice may have to be
translated into a more accessible secular voice if it is to carry any weight in a
decisionmaking process that includes those who do not share the underlying faith
that gives the religious language its special life.
There remain, however, occasions when it is appropriate and perhaps even
necessary to speak in a religious voice in the public square. If, for example, one
believes that God would have them speak in their religious voice, despite its
general inaccessibility, it is incumbent-a matter of religious duty or conscienceon that individual to speak in that voice. The speaker may even feel duty-bound
to make others aware of the fact that the religious voice is being used.
As one who considers himself to be deeply religious, and believes in the
possibility of speaking in a manner that conveys a special spiritual feeling, there
may also be occasions when using the religious tongue makes it possible for the
speaker to speak with added force, even to the non-believer. One of my children
relates that when he first arrived in Jerusalem for a study abroad program, he was
unable to sleep, so he wandered out of his room during the call to early morning
prayers in the Mosque. As the sound of the call to prayer drifted to my son, tears
filled in his eyes. He felt a special force in the religious voices drawn out in
prayer, even though he did not share the faith or language of those praying. By
the same token, however, I have a dear friend, who, as a child, had a much
different experience with the very same call to prayer. He felt a fear that a call
was being issued that did not include him. He was apprehensive that the call
might ultimately be issued for the purpose of harming him. It is, therefore, critical
that the religionist speaking be aware of the differing ways in which his or her
religious voice may be interpreted. Having acknowledged this, it is arguable that
both Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. were able to combine their religious
voices with matters of public concern and connect in special ways with many
listeners, including many who did not share their respective religious beliefs.
There are also practical reasons why resorting to the use of the religious
voice may be worthwhile. Use of the religious voice conveys a sense to the

51. My three eldest sons speak three different languages: French, Portuguese, and Spanish. They
each delight in their respective second language, but when they are involved in making a collective
decision, they speak in their native and common tongue, English. Given their desire to permit access
to the dialogue, they select a tongue common to all.
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friendly listener of the importance of what is being said to the speaker, even if the
listener cannot understand fully what is being said. A religionist, therefore, might
resort to the religious tongue for the purpose of having the listener understand
that the matter being addressed is of "ultimate concern"52 to the speaker. An
individual seeking to persuade others (e.g., a legislative or administrative body)
that he or she ought to be exempted from a law that adversely violates his or her
religious conscience might, therefore, utilize the language of his or her religion to
persuade the listener of the law's gravity as applied to the speaker. When I was
nineteen, I became convinced, as a religious and philosophical matter, that I could
not kill another and found it necessary to seek an exemption from our draft laws.
I prepared a document setting forth the conflict between my personal religious
conscience and the obligation potentially to kill another, if drafted. In setting
forth my position, it was necessary for me to draw upon the religious reasons that
motivated my seeking of an exemption. I found it necessary to speak in the
religious voice, and draft law actually required that I do so, by mandating the
giving of religious reasons for my convictions.
A final, and for me far more questionable, reason for using the religious
voice is to mobilize those who share one's belief and obtain their support in the
public decisionmaking process. This effort to persuade or dissuade fellow
religionists from taking a particular position is potentially pernicious. When the
religious voice is used to commandeer the political decisionmaking process, it
alienates others from the dialogue and the ultimate decision. Sadly, however, I
believe it must be conceded that, where a particular religion predominates,
religionists will often mobilize, either in public or in private. In our system,
therefore, which often disfavors religious mobilization in the formal or public
decisionmaking process, such mobilization may simply shift to private rooms,
where the uninitiated are not permitted access. When such decisions are made in
a private caucus, controlled wholly by the religionists, all benefits of public
dialogue dissipate. As pernicious, therefore, as such decisionmaking based on the
religious voice may be, it may be more friendly to do it openly where at least the
non-religionist is able to react and hopefully cause the religionists to take care to
provide basic due process, an opportunity to be heard, on the part of those being
excluded. Furthermore, the friendly remedy in that context might simply be to
permit exemption of the non-religionists from any such law passed by the
majority.
Whatever the best response to the problem of religious commandeering of
the public decisionmaking process may be, it is clear that such commandeering is
unfriendly to the person who does not share the religious beliefs of the majority.
Religionists would do well, in a purely prudential sense, to realize, however, that
they and their children generally live in a system where religionists are often a
minority. When they are a minority, the religious want to be treated in a friendly

52. The Columbia Encyclopedia (Paul Lagasse, 6th ed., Columbia U. Press 2000) (available at
<http://www.bartleby.com/65/ti/Tillich.html>) (using Paul Johannes Tillian's words).
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manner and to be taken seriously as religionists by the majority who do not share
their religious perspective. Those who are religious, therefore, would do well to
take a more friendly approach to those who do not share their religious beliefs in
instances when the religious hold power and could commandeer the process to
their own ends. In short, true friendship is reciprocal. If the religious want to be
taken seriously, then they must take seriously those who do not share their
religious beliefs. Being taken seriously in this context mitigates against excluding
others from the dialogue or commandeering the process without providing due
process and possibly even an exemption from decisions that are traceable to a
religious commandeering of the process.
B.

An Example of the Problem: "Under God" and the Flag Salute

In respecting religion and the religious voice in the public square, Professor
Levinson offers a caveat:
Accepting religious arguments as appropriate for the public square does not mean
abandoning the Establishment Clause. I would interpret the Clause to prohibit the
use of the state apparatus to declare theological positions or otherwise infuse an
overtly religious sensibility into public life. I would, therefore, not hesitate to hold
unconstitutional the placement of "In God We Trust" on our coins and "under
53
God" in the pledge of allegiance to the flag ....
Sandy, therefore, offers two reasons for holding the inclusion of the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to be unconstitutional: (1) It is a
declaration of a theological position; and (2) It "infuse[s] an overtly religious
sensibility into public life." It is evident that Sandy would agree with Judge
Goodwin's recent decision for the Ninth Circuit in Newdow v. U.S. Congress,54 in
which the court held that the inclusion of the words "under God" in the Pledge
and the school district's policy and practice of teacher-directed recitation of the
Pledge violated the First Amendment's establishment limitation.
In that opinion, Judge Goodwin found that the use and recitation of the
phrase "one nation under God" in the Pledge constituted an unconstitutional
endorsement of religion:
In the context of the Pledge, the statement that the United States is a nation "under
God" is an endorsement of religion. It is a profession of a religious belief, namely, a
belief in monotheism. The recitation that ours is a nation "under God" is not a
mere acknowledgment that many Americans believe in a deity. Nor is it merely
descriptive of the undeniable historical significance of religion in the founding of the
Republic. Rather, the phrase "one nation under God" in the context of the Pledge
is normative. To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United States; instead, it is
to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag stands: unity, indivisibility,
liberty, justice, and-since 1954-monotheism. The text of the official Pledge,

53. See Levinson, supra n. 35, at 2077.
54. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
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codified in federal law, impermissibly takes a position
with respect to the purely
55
religious question of the existence and identity of God.

In applying the endorsement test, Judge Goodwin added that, "The
Pledge... is an impermissible government endorsement of religion because it
sends a message to unbelievers 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community. ' '5 6 He also found that the
policy and Act mandating the recitation of the Pledge and its "one nation under
God" language violated the coercion test: "[T]he Act place[s] students in the
untenable position of choosing between participating in an exercise with religious
content or protesting."57 Goodwin concludes, on similar grounds, that both the
policy and the Act "fail[ ] the Lemon test."58 Professor Levinson and Judge
Goodwin apparently agree that inclusion of the phrase "under God" in the Pledge
ought to be unconstitutional because, through it, the government effectively
declares or endorses a theological position (monotheism) and "infuse[s] an overtly
religious sensibility into public life" that has the effect of sending a necessarily
coercive message to non-believing school children that they are outsiders.
Sandy and Judge Goodwin's position that the phrase "under God" ought to
be excised from the Pledge seems to be a friendly act. A friend would generally
recognize that commandeering the government to declare one's own religious
belief superior to that of a friend, who does not share that belief, is an unfriendly
act. First, it has the effect of shutting down dialogue among disagreeing friends (it
has the government declaring one side a winner before the dialogue has come to
an end). Secondly, it requires that a friend and his or her children go through the
agonizing process of either (1) acquiescing to the government declaration of belief
contrary to their own religious consciences, or (2) taking a public and generally
unpopular position by either refusing to recite the words or by sitting during the
recitation of the Pledge. Indeed, the religionist who favors inclusion of the phrase
over the conscientious views of a "friend" would also do well to remember that
any government that can require the recitation of one religious belief
(monotheism in the Pledge) might also one day require recitation of some other
belief that might be offensive to the religionist-an act that the religionist would
surely find unfriendly. 9 Thus, inclusion of the phrase "under God" in the Pledge
may be viewed as failing the reciprocal nature of friendship.

55. Id. at 607.
56. Id. at 608 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
57. Id. In a footnote, he added that, "The 'subtle and indirect' social pressure which permeates the
classroom also renders more acute the message sent to non-believing schoolchildren that they are
outsiders." Id. at 609 n. 8.
58. Id. at 611 (discussing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). The Lemon test requires that
for government conduct to survive an Establishment Clause claim, the conduct "(1) must have a
secular purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and (3) must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. at 605 (citing
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613).
59. See Daniel3:1-20 (King James).
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There is more to the analysis, however. In his dissent in the Newdow case,
Judge Fernandez disagrees with Judge Goodwin and the court and concludes: "I
cannot accept the eliding of the simple phrase 'under God' from our Pledge of
Allegiance, when it is obvious that its tendency to establish religion in this country
'6
or to interfere with the free exercise (or non-exercise) of religion is de minimis. 0
After asserting that the tendency of the inclusion of the language to "establish
religion (or affect its exercise) is exiguous, ''61 Judge Fernandez recognized "that
some people may not feel good about hearing the phrases recited in their
presence, but, then, others might not feel good if they are omitted. 62 Judge
Fernandez observed that the impact of inclusion of the phrase "under God" in the
Pledge is minimal. He also recognized that, regardless of whether the phrase is
excised or included, it is likely to offend someone's religious or non-religious
sensibilities. The need for evaluating the impact on the believer of excising
"under God" and the impact on the non-believer by continuing to include the
phrase, therefore, merit further exploration in determining how friends with
differing religious views should treat one another in this context.
In examining whether the impact is de minimis among friends, it is not
enough to ask whether the practice of including "under God" in the Pledge tends
to lead to the establishment of a religion or group of religions to the exclusion of
others. It is necessary to examine the impact on individuals as well-those who
favor excising the phrase and those who would disfavor its excision. Indeed, a
focus on individuals and the harm to them is critical in assessing how a friend
ought to proceed in this case.
Newdow is clearly concerned about whether his child will have to recite the
phrase "one nation under God" in the school setting. In requiring recitation of
this phrase, the government seems to place its stamp of approval on a religious
view other than the one he, as a parent, seeks to teach in the home. Friends would
surely be quite sensitive about forcing religious teachings on children of parents
who hold differing views as a matter of conscience. The religionist who is
concerned about the government placing its imprimatur on a view regarding the
origin of this world, evolution versus creation, a view that contradicts his own,
should be sensitive, in a reciprocal and friendly sense, when the government
requires Mr. Newdow's children to pledge their allegiance to a "nation under
God." By the same token, however, the impact of the excising of the phrase
"under God" on the believer must also be weighed in the balance. Many religious
parents believe that the school system is pervasively secular and excision of the
phrase "under God" from the Pledge would be a final confirmation for them that

60. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 615 (Fernandez, J., concurring and dissenting). He responds to those who
fear the effects of inclusion of the language "under God" in the Pledge: "Those who are somehow
beset by residual doubts and fears should find comfort in the reflection that no baleful religious effects
have been generated by the existence of similar references to a deity throughout our history. More
specifically, it is difficult to detect any signs of incipient theocracy springing up since the Pledge was
amended in 1954." Id. at 614 n. 4.
61. Id. at 614.
62. Id.
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the public square and schools are unfriendly to them and their beliefs-that their
beliefs are disfavored and ignored on a regular basis.
Newdow, Judge Goodwin, and Sandy also argue that requiring the recitation
of the phrase "one nation under God" is coercive, placing inappropriate pressure
on impressionable school children who do not believe in the phrase "one nation
under God" and who must either sit or stand while others recite the words. Either
act is noticeable and may bring in its wake unwelcome attention on the child who
declines to engage in pledging his or her allegiance to "one nation under God." In
third grade, I sat next to a girl whose family were Jehovah's Witnesses. Each day
as we would rise as a class to recite the Pledge, Patricia would sit. She was
ridiculed and indelibly, it seemed, marked as an outsider. I still feel poignantly for
her and I regret that I was not more courageous and understanding, that I was not
a better friend. I admired her exercise of conscience even then, but not enough to
extend a true hand of friendship by trying to find a way to accommodate her
religious conscience in a less conspicuous and friendly manner. While it is better
to permit a student to sit, as opposed to forcing them to stand and recite in
opposition to their conscience, sitting or declining to participate in all or a portion
of the Pledge may not be a de minimis or inconsequential act for a school child, as
Patricia's experience evidenced to me.
The case, therefore, for excising the language "under God" from the Pledge
seems particularly strong in the context of a mandatory recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance by school children. Once again, however, the answer is not so simple.
One reason the words "under God" were added to the Pledge was to recognize
that, at least for many citizens, our nation is great in part because it has not
forgotten God or ignored those who believe in God. For many of those believers,
pledging allegiance to our flag and nation, without recognizing the hand of God in
our lives and the life of our nation, would constitute a serious affront to their
religious conscience. To purge "under God" from the Pledge would, therefore,
force them to pledge allegiance to their nation to the exclusion of their God.
Frankly, one would hope those whose first allegiance is to their God would not
stand to recite a Pledge that had formally excised recognition of their God. Thus,
we cannot avoid the problem of Patricia-in today's world, some students are
going to be harmed by having to demonstrate their opposition to the recitation of
the Pledge, whatever form it may take.
The friendly approach does not offer much of an answer to the quandary,
because excising the language will harm some and refusing to excise it will harm
others.63 Simply not reciting the Pledge may not be fully acceptable either.

63. Michael Perry has recently wrestled with the issue of the inclusion of "under God" language in
the Pledge of Allegiance, on grounds of principle and prudence, and has explicated arguments on both
sides of the issue. Perry, supra n. 16, at 30-40. Michael concludes that inclusion of the "under God"

language should be held to be nonviolative of the nonestablishment norm for the following reasons:
Since 1954, the Pledge of Allegiance has echoed Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address in
declaring that we are "one nation under God".... In affirming, with Lincoln, that ours is a
nation that stands under the judgment of a righteous God, it seems clear that government is
not treating any church (or any range of the theologically kindred churches) as the official
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Certainly, we can avoid reciting some things, including the Pledge, 64 but we cannot
avoid involving students in ways that impact adversely on their consciences or
their parents' consciences.
As evidenced by the evolution versus creation
description of the origins of the earth, however, schools do enter the fray, perhaps
of necessity, from time to time. Indeed, in our increasingly diverse world, a school
system would potentially be left with little to teach if it simply refused to teach or
require recitation of material that violated the consciences of a student or parent.
Sensitivity to student and parental conscience, however, should always be weighed
in the balance in determining whether something ought to be taught, the manner
of such teaching, and whether students should be permitted to opt out regarding
teachings that violated their right of conscience.
Thus, while the friendship model of analysis does not yield a clear answer in
the debate over whether the words "under God" should be purged from the
Pledge or whether the Pledge should be recited by impressionable school children,
it does offer a helpful process for evaluating such seemingly intractable issues. If
we examine such issues with the intent of treating others as our own, as friends,
despite our differences in beliefs, we are sensitized to concerns and will be more
ardent in our efforts to find meaningful accommodations. The governing body of
a school district will, I suggest, be less likely to act reflexively in adopting a policy
that impacts someone's conscience if they have heard the anguished voice of those
harmed. Even if the school leaders are unable or unwilling to make friendly
accommodations, a friendly process should expose the broader community,
including other students, to the plight of those harmed. And the person harmed
will have been afforded some due process and the respect that comes from having

church of the political community; government is not bestowing legal favor or privilege on
any church in relation to any other church; government is not taking any action that favors
any church in relation to another church on the basis of the view that the favored church is,
as a church, as a community of faith, better along one or another dimension of value;
government is not privileging either membership in, or a worship practice of, any church.
Now, the second reason that the more restrictive understanding is problematic: Very few
citizens of the United States would take seriously-very few would tolerate-a
constitutional provision according to which having "under God" in the Pledge, or "In God
We Trust" as the national motto, or beginning a session of court with "God save the United
States and this Honorable Court," is unconstitutional. Such a provision would be widely
regarded, and dismissed, as extreme.
Id. at 33-35.
64. It might be argued that the Pledge is quite different from the teaching of evolution or some
other material that may violate the religious consciences of some students or parents. Evolution, with
its basis in scientific theory, is pedagogical in a way that reciting the Pledge may not be. Thus, refusing
to require recitation of the Pledge would not compromise the academic mission of schools in the way
that refusing to teach evolution might. Nevertheless, purging all that is religious from schools-e.g.,
refusing to permit students to sing Handel's Messiah-may impinge on the academic mission of
schools. Furthermore, purging all that is religious from the public square, simply because it may either
constitute a theological declaration or be overtly religious, makes a statement about religion in itself.
Students observing the purging of that which is religious from schools may well conclude, wrongly
perhaps, that the purging is the result of some animus toward things religious. If Newdow, who is an
atheist, succeeds in purging the words "under God" from the Pledge, he will have won the cultural or
religious battle-his view will have prevailed. Purging all that is religious from the public square and
schools, therefore, also sends an unfriendly message of winners and losers, insiders and outsiders.
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one's voice heard.65 Courts will also have a better record to evaluate in
determining whether the action taken was based on animus toward the harmed
individual's conscience. The Court should intervene if the act of requiring or
refusing to continue to require the recitation of the Pledge was based on an intent
to disfavor someone's religious conscience. Furthermore, failure to look for
meaningful ways to accommodate those who may be harmed may constitute
evidence of animus and inappropriate insensitivity and may be sufficient grounds
for finding an intent to disfavor.
The treating of others as our own-as friends or worthy members of our
human family-analytical model, like all process-driven models, does have a
major drawback. It involves high transaction costs. If there is a bright-line rule
that either permits or prohibits a given act-e.g., recitation of the Pledge in a
public school setting-transaction costs are low. A party knows where he or she
stands and would be foolish to spend the resources necessary to challenge a clearly
accepted rule. Where animus is contextual and can be proven, however,
transaction costs increase because a party may be able to establish a case on the
facts presented. Being given the opportunity to speak out-to give voice to one's
conscience, whether on Newdow's side or on the religionist's side of the question,
and to engage others in a dialogue-is a friendly act, even though it must be
acknowledged that it may carry costs for all concerned.
The Pledge of Allegiance, regardless of whether it includes the phrase
"under God" or not, is not neutral as to matters of religious conscience. Some
governmental acts may well be, or at least appear to be, neutral, however. We are
left to examine how a friend would respond in that context.
C.

Neutral Laws of GeneralApplicability: A Friendly Approach

In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,66 the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, held that
neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally limited acts of religious
conscience were not subject to heightened scrutiny and did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This decision may be unfriendly to
religious persons, as evidenced by the following example.
Two young men I know graduated from a public high school last year near
the top of their class. A major trust associated with that school provided funds for
scholarships for students near the top of the class and both of the young men
qualified for scholarships of $12,000, payable at the rate of $3,000 per year over a
period of four consecutive years. Each of them were elated and stood to benefit
greatly from the scholarships. The young men were aware of a possible problem,

65. It must be acknowledged, however, particularly with impressionable school children, that asking
them to step forward and explain publicly why a given action violates their conscience may itself be
insensitive, a cause for substantial embarrassment and discomfort. Generally, however, it is the
parents who step forward and they are less timid, although their very lack of timidity may result in
substantial discomfort for the children, when they face their peers after their parents have spoken.
66. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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however. The scholarships were to be paid consecutively over the four-year
period, beginning in the fall or summer after their graduation from high school,
but the young men intended to interrupt their education by serving a two-year
mission for their church and would not be attending school continually during the
four-year period. They wrote letters to the trustees asking for an exemption from
the facially neutral rule of general applicability that required them to take the
funds over the four-year period immediately following their graduation.
Without a hearing of any sort, their requests for an exemption on the ground
of religious conscience were perfunctorily denied and the scholarships were
offered to students whose academic records were not as strong. Indeed, their
honest request for an exemption led to their being denied any part of the award.
Had they simply been dishonest or refused to disclose their intentions to serve
missions, they could have received at least a portion of the award. These young
men were deeply hurt by both the failure to respond positively to what they
considered to be reasonable requests for exemptions and by the callous
insensitivity of the board in rejecting their requests. Thus, rather than graduating
with pride in their accomplishments and their school, they left with a distaste for
the school and its administration, a sense they had been treated in an unfair and,
to use our terminology, unfriendly manner.
When a parent of one of the young men called the lawyer for the board to
express his concerns over the insensitive rejection of the young men's request for
an exemption, the lawyer went out of his way to assure the parent that the
exemption was not denied on religious grounds (i.e., that it was not based on
animus against the young men or their religion).67 This neutral rule of general
applicability, as applied to the young men, was unfriendly to them. Instead of
building bridges between the young men and their school, the rule was divisive, by
its terms and as applied.
By way of contrast, an example of a friendly act, in extending an exemption
in a very sensitive area, is in order. As previously noted, as a young man, over
thirty years ago, I was opposed to war on the grounds of religious conscience and
sought an exemption from the draft on those grounds. Once again, a letter
initiated the process. The writing of the letter gave me an opportunity to share my
reasons with the draft board that would ultimately determine whether an
exemption would be granted. I was apprehensive, because I knew that if the
board did not grant my request for an exemption, my conscience might require me
to go to prison. I was also worried because I knew that the chairman of the board
was a retired military officer and another member was the mother of one of my
67. The young men are members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (commonly and
sometimes derisively referred to as "Mormons"). Clergy from other religions in the area often preach
against the "Mormons," and the young men and the chairman of the board were both well aware of
this fact. While the young men harbor doubts about whether the board was acting out of animus-it
had granted an exemption to another young man for personal reasons in the past-it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, to prove animus or an intent to discriminate on religious grounds. It is not
easy to prove discrimination of any sort, because people are disinclined to admit that they are racists or
bigots. It is not so difficult, however, to see that the insensitivity displayed by the board and the school
was unfriendly.
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classmates who had given his life in Vietnam. I appeared before the board and
answered a series of questions that.evidenced the board's sensitivity to my plight.
A few weeks later, a letter arrived from the draft board. With great concern, I
opened the envelope, the contents of which would indicate whether my nation
would recognize my sincere religious conscience. As I read the letter granting my
exemption, I wept in gratitude. I trace my patriotism, which is palpable, more to
that single moment than to any other. The board and the nation it represented
had acted in a friendly manner to my request for an exemption. I have since
viewed this nation in a very favorable-we might say friendly-manner.
These examples evidence that the granting of exemptions from neutral laws
of general applicability, on the ground of religious conscience, is clearly a friendly
act. The failure to do so is a less friendly act. At a minimum, if we want to have a
legal system that is friendly to persons of religious conscience, a process needs to
be developed whereby the religious person is given an opportunity to present his
or her case and the body deciding whether to grant the exemption is required to
give reasons for its decision. The failure to provide such a process and to seek to
accommodate religious conscience where possible is surely an unfriendly act.
Sadly, after its decision in the Smith case, the Supreme Court decided to follow an
unfriendly course.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Professor Sandy Levinson's friendly approach toward religious conscience is
worthy of emulation, on a personal and a professional level. Sandy's friendship
extends beyond the personal to the professional, as he seeks to contribute to the
dialogue on the role of religion in the public square. Knowing Sandy, and being
edified by his scholarly work, has been a source of inspiration in my life. He will
surely disagree with some of my conclusions. I trust, however, that we will remain
friends and he will continue to encourage my contributions, feeble as they may be,
to a dialogue we both consider to be very important.
In a world where values clash and important issues appear to be difficult to
resolve, what we need more of are approaches that are friendly, that encourage
dialogue, and take differences seriously. In short, we need more of Professor
Sandy Levinson.
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